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SMOKE, NOT FIRE 
NEAL DEVINS* 
One week before the 2004 presidential election, then Chief Jus-
tice William Rehnquist disclosed that he underwent a tracheotomy in 
connection with a recent diagnosis of thyroid cancer.1 That an-
nouncement left little doubt that the winner of the 2004 election 
would reshape the face of the Supreme Court. That announcement, 
however, fell on deaf ears. The press gave limited attention to the 
story and neither John Kerry nor George Bush used the announce-
ment to focus attention on the Supreme Court. Not surprisingly, the 
announcement about the Chief Justice had no impact on the electo-
rate: exit polls revealed that the Supreme Court was a non-factor in 
the presidential election. In one poll, only one percent ofvoters (out 
of 569 polled) ranked the Supreme Court as the most important fac-
tor in their decision. 2 In another poll, fewer than 0.5% of registered 
voters (out of 900 polled) stated that the Supreme Court should be 
President Bush's top priority in his second term.3 
Against this backdrop, one would think that Congress sees the 
judiciary as a low salience issue-something that does not merit time 
or attention. Think again. Over the past five years, the courts have 
been the whipping boy of both the left and the right. Liberals have 
condemned the Court for engaging in "conservative judicial activism;" 
conservatives, among other things, have proposed stripping the courts 
of jurisdiction on same-sex marriage and the Pledge of Allegiance.4 
What gives? If both sides have bones to pick with the Court, why 
not treat the Court as an important election issue? In the pages that 
follow, I will provide an explanation of sorts for the di~unction be-
* Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and 
Mary. Thanks to Laura Mangel and jeff Mead for helping me research this Essay. Thanks 
also to Lou Fisher and participants in the Maryland/Geargetown Constitutional Law Schmooze 
for comments on a preliminary draft of this Essay. 
1. Press Release, Supreme Court of the United States, Press Release Regarding Chief 
Justice William H. Rehnquist (Oct. 25, 2004), available at http:/ /www.supremecourtus.gov/ 
publicinfo/ press/ pr _1 0-25-04.h tml. 
2. Press Release, Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Moral Values: How 
Important? Voters Liked Campaign 2004, but Too Much "Mud-Slinging" 15 (Nov. 11, 
2004), available at http:/ /people-press.org/reports/pdf/233.pdf. 
3. Fox News/Opinion Dynamics, The Bush Administration, Supreme Court Nomina-
tions (Nov. 18, 2004), http:/ /nationaljournal.com/members/polltrack/2004/todays/11/ 
1119fox.htm. 
4. See infra notes 32-58 and accompanying text. 
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tween lawmaker complaints about the Court and the Court's apparent 
irrelevance to the electorate. 5 Specifically, I will argue that conserva-
tives and liberals castigate the Court to secure support from their 
base. These attacks, however, are largely rhetorical. Conservatives 
and liberals are not upset with the Court. For reasons I will soon de-
tail, the Rehnquist Court typically paid close attention to the signals 
sent to it by Congress and the American people. More than that, 
lawmakers understand that the aggressive pursuit of court-curbing 
measures might come back to haunt them at the polls. Throughout 
our nation's history, "median voters" have supported judicial indepen-
dence.6 Put another way: Rhetorical attacks on the Court serve the 
interests of lawmakers by securing their base; heartfelt aggressive at-
tacks against the Court may alienate median voters. 
* * * 
It would be wrong to label the Rehnquist Court as either liberal 
or conservative. 7 On the one hand, the Court had backed numerous 
liberal causes: abortion,8 affirmative action,9 campaign finance, 10 gay 
rights, 11 school prayer, 12 Miranda warnings, 13 constitutional protec-
tions for enemy combatants, 14 and free speech on the Internet. 15 On 
the other hand, the Court helped hand George Bush the 2000 presi-
5. No doubt voters are far more interested in the Supreme Court today (Fall 2005) 
than they were a year ago. The resignation ofjustice O'Connor, the death of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, and the Harriet Miers debacle have fueled voter interest in the Supreme Court. 
V\Thether or not voter interest in the Court continues, it is nevertheless true that Rehnquist 
Court decision making did not provoke voters into thinking that the Supreme Court was 
an important electoral issue in 2004. 
6. Barry Friedman has written several articles on this topic. E.g., Barry Friedman, Me-
diated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MicH. L. REv. 2596 (2003) [hereinafter Friedman, Me-
diated Popular Constitutionalism]; Barry Friedman, "Things rargotten" in the Debate over judicial 
Independence, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 737 (1998). 
7. This point is anything but novel. See, e.g., MARK TusHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE 
REHNQUIST CouRT AND THE FuTURE OF CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw (2005); Barry Friedman, The 
Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function of judicial Review, 72 U. C1N. L. REv. 1257, 
1264-66 (2004); William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of judicial Activism, 73 
U . CoLO. L. REv. 1217, 1254 (2002); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Op-Ed., A Court Not Easy to 
Classify, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2000, at A31. 
8. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
9. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
10. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
11. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
12. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
13. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) . 
14. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
15. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 
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dential election. 16 Moreover, its revival of federalism resulted in the 
invalidation of legislation regulating firearms, 17 domestic violence, 18 
and anti-discrimination measures protecting the aged,19 the dis-
abled,20 and religious minorities.21 
In making sense of these disparate rulings, I am quite con-
vinced-as Robert Dahl put it in 1957-that the Court's constitutional 
decisions "are never for long out of line with the policy views domi-
nant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States."22 The 
Court's 1992 reaffirmation of Roe v. Wadt?3 is linked to the Senate's 
rejection of Robert Bork in 1987 and public support for limited abor-
tion rights; its approval of affirmative action in 2003 seems very much 
tied to the fact that elected officials, business interests, and elites 
strongly supported race preferences in education; most telling, its re-
vival of federalism can be traced to public and lawmaker support for 
devolving power away from Washington, D.C. and to the states.24 
By issuing decisions that match the social and political forces that 
beat against it, lawmakers have not been pressured by voters or inter-
est groups to curb the Court. More than that, the American people 
have favored judicial independence, especially when Supreme Court 
decisions do not upset majoritarian preferences. 25 Perhaps for this 
reason, a November 2001 poll revealed that eighty-four percent of 
Americans have either "some," "quite a lot," or a "great deal" of confi-
dence in the Supreme Court. 26 
16. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
17. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
18. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
19. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
20. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
21. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
22. Robert A Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker, 6 J. Pus. L. 279, 285 (1957). 
23. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
24. I have spent much of the past five years writing books and articles that make this 
point. See, e.g., NEAL DEVINS & Lou is FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CoNSTITUTION (2004) (ar-
guing that constitutional law is rightly shaped by many forces outside of the judiciary); 
Neal Devins, The Majoritarian Rehnquist Court?, 67 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoss. 63 (2004). On 
the issue of federalism, a caveat: I am not arguing that today's Congress never seeks to shift 
power away from the states and towards the national government. My point, instead, is 
that today's Congress is more willing to embrace states' rights rhetoric and, as such, politi-
cal conditions favored the Rehnquist Court's federalism revival. 
25. See Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 6, at 2616-29 (discussing 
the findings of Gregory A Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the 
Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. PoL. Sci. 635 (1992), which documented that the public will sup-
port the Supreme Court even if it disagrees with particular decisions). 
26. Roper Ctr. for Pub. Opinion, U.S. Public Opinion on the Supreme Court-Confi-
dence in the Supreme Court (Nov. 2001), http: / / www.ropercenter.uconn.edu (search On-
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Against this backdrop, lawmakers understand that there are real 
costs in pursuing court-curbing proposals. 27 That does not mean, 
however, that lawmakers do not have reason to bad mouth the judici-
ary. Indeed, the growing ideological divide in Congress creates incen-
tives for both liberals and conservatives to strengthen their base by 
engaging in political grandstanding. 
Let me explain: Ever since 1980, an ever-growing ideological gap 
has separated Democrats and Republicans. In the House of Repre-
sentatives, for example, the most liberal Republican is more conserva-
tive than the most conservative Democrat.28 One outgrowth of this 
phenomenon is that lawmakers, especially in the House, are not inter-
ested in appealing to centrist voters. In particular, with computer-
driven redistricting guaranteeing that Democrats will win certain seats 
and Republicans other seats, the party primary often controls who will 
win the election.29 Not surprisingly, lawmakers pay increasing atten-
tion to the partisans who vote in the primaries. 
In an effort to secure their base, Democrats and Republicans are 
increasingly concerned with "message politics," that is, using the legis-
lative process to make a symbolic statement to voters and other con-
stituents.30 Lawmakers, moreover, turn more and more to so-called 
"position taking" legislation. "The electoral requirement [of such 
measures] is not that [a lawmaker] make pleasing things happen but 
that he make pleasing judgmental statements."31 Correspondingly, 
even if a judicial ruling barely registers with voters and interest 
groups, lawmakers may nevertheless firm up their base by taking a 
position on purported judicial overreaching. 
line Access to Date, Public Opinion Matters). Fall 2005 polls, however, suggest that there is 
declining public support both for the Supreme Court and for judicial independence. See 
Neal Devins, Should the Supreme Courl Fear Congress?, 90 MINN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2006) 
(discussing recent polls and their ramifications). 
27. See generally john Ferejohn, Independent judges, Dependent judiciary: Explainingjudicial 
Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 353 (1999) (providing an insightful treatment of the politi-
cal costs of court curbing). 
28. See Keith Poole & Nolan McCarty, 108th House Rank Ordering (Aug. 23, 2005), 
http://voteview.com/houl08.htrn (detailing how Republican and Democrat voting pat-
terns were perfectly separated along liberal and conservative tendencies). 
29. See Samuel Issacharoff, Collateral Damage: The Endangered Center in American Politics, 
46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 415, 427-28 (2004) (arguing that gerrymandered districts eliminate 
the importance of the general election). 
30. See C. Lawrence Evans, Committees, Leaders, and Message Politics, in CoNGREss REcoN-
SIDERED 217, 219-26 {Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2001) (ex-
plaining how parties develop a message that is furthered through both legislative and 
electoral strategies) . 
31. DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 62 (1974). 
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Consider, for example, Senate Democrat claims that the Rehn-
quist Court engaged in "conseiVative judicial activism" and House Re-
publican efforts to prevent "activist" judges from voiding the Pledge of 
Allegiance, embracing same-sex marriage, and looking to foreign law 
when deciding cases. Rather than express heartfelt disappointment 
with Supreme Court decisions, Republicans and Democrats both used 
the 'judicial activism" label to solidify their base and, in so doing, dis-
tance themselves from each other. 
In the wake of the 2000 presidential election (and, with it, Bush v. 
Gore), Senate Democrats launched their campaign against conseiVa-
tive judicial activism. Senate Democrats called attention to differ-
ences between their message and that of the President and his party 
by contending-in the words of then Senate Judiciary Chairman Pat-
rick Leahy-that the Supreme Court was stacked with "ideologically 
conseiVative Republican appointees," making the "dominant flavor of 
judicial activism ... right wing."32 Through newspaper editorials, 
floor statements, television appearances, and hearings, Senate Demo-
crats advanced a two-pronged message, namely: (1) the Rehnquist 
Court's federalism campaign is "conseiVative," "activist," and targeting 
civil rights and individual liberties, and (2) Democrats must work hard 
to ensure ideological balance on a Supreme Court run amok. 33 "What 
we're trying to do," said Senator Charles Schumer, "is set the stage 
and make sure that both the White House and the Senate Republi-
cans know [what] we expect."34 
Senate Democrats had good reason to launch this attack on the 
Court. By suggesting that their vision of the federal judiciary (a Court 
that protects civil and individual rights) is at odds with the Republican 
vision, Democrats appealed to their base. More than that, the "con-
seiVative judicial activism" label served both as a rallying call and a 
cover to Democratic efforts to prevent President Bush from ap-
pointing conservative judges and Justices. At the same time, there is 
little reason to think that Democrats, in fact, were especially disap-
pointed with Supreme Court decisions invalidating federal statutes. A 
search of the Congressional Record reveals that lawmakers did not dis-
cuss-let alone criticize-these rulings.35 Likewise, lawmakers did not 
32. 147 CoNe. REc. S1671-72 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
33. This and much of the analysis on the Democrats' campaign against conservative 
judicial activism is taken from Neal Devins, The rederalism-Rights Nexus: Explaining W'hy Sen-
ate Democrats Can Tolerate Rehnquist Courl Decision Making but Not the Rehnquist Courl, 73 U. 
CoLo. L. REv. 1307, 1329-30 (2002). 
34. Neil A. Lewis, Washington Talk; Democrats Readying far judicial Fight, N.Y. TIMES, May 
1, 2001, at A19. 
35. Devins, supra note 33, at 1311-12. 
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openly challenge these rulings through proposed legislation or consti-
tutional amendments.36 This disjunction between Senate Democrat 
claims about the Rehnquist Court and lawmaker responses to Rehn-
quist Court rulings strongly suggests that the "consexvative judicial ac-
tivism" label was little more than a rhetorical device. 
House Republican efforts in 2004 to strip federal court jurisdic-
tion are cut from a similar cloth. Sponsors of these measures did not 
want to enact legislation countermanding the Supreme Court; in-
stead, they wanted to make a symbolic statement. Republican leaders 
of the House Judiciary Committee, for example, never bothered to 
take a vote on a proposal (sponsored by seventy-four Republicans 
from well-established red states and Ohio) to prevent federal courts 
from using foreign law.37 Introduced on March 17, 2004, the commit-
tee held a two-hour hearing on March 25th and then let the matter 
drop.38 Likewise, no vote was taken on the Constitution Restoration 
Act of 2004,39 a bill that would have stripped the federal courts of 
jurisdiction in cases involving federal or state officials' "acknowledg-
ment of God as the sovereign source of law, liberty, or government."40 
Introduced in February 2004, hearings were not held until September 
13, 2004 (roughly two weeks before Congress's pre-election recess).41 
House Republicans, moreover, never intended to give the Senate 
a chance to vote on legislation that would restrict court power over 
same-sex marriage and the Pledge of Allegiance. The same-sex mar-
riage bill42 was introduced in October 2003 (one month before the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court recognized same-sex marriage) 43 but 
36. !d. at 1312-14. When enacting legislation responding to these Court rulings, 
lawmakers spoke about the need to conform with Supreme Court standards and, in so 
doing, treated these decisions as final and authoritative. /d. at 1312-13. 
37. H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004); [2003-2004 Transfer Binder] Cong. Index 
(CCH) 34,551 (Dec. 30, 2004). 
38. Appropriate Role of rareign judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing on 
H.R 568 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1 08th Con g. 
(2004). 
39. H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. (2004); [2003-2004 Transfer Binder] Cong. Index, supra 
note 37, at 34,523. 
40. H.R. 3799. Sponsors of this measure wanted to register their disapproval of federal 
court orders requiring Alabama Chief justice Roy Moore to remove a granite monument of 
the Ten Commandments that he had installed in the state supreme court rotunda. Sam 
Rosenfeld, Disorder in the Court, AM. PROSPEcr, July 2005, at 24, 24-25. 
41. Constitution Restoration Act of 2004: Hearing on H.R 3799 Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the judicimy, 108th Cong. 
(2004). 
42. Marriage Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2003) . 
43. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 941 (Mass. 2003). 
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was not voted on until July 22, 200444 (one week after the Senate re-
jected a proposed constitutional amendment on same-sex mar-
riage).45 Approved by a party-line vote of 233 to 194,46 the bill was 
referred to the Senate on September 7, 2004 (less than three weeks 
before Congress's pre-election recess).47 The timing of the Pledge 
Protection Act of 200448 is an even more dramatic illustration of 
House disinterest in getting the bill to the Senate in time for meaning-
ful Senate considerations. First referred to the House Judiciary Com-
mittee in May 2003,49 no action was taken on the Pledge bill until the 
Judiciary Committee ordered it reported on September 15, 2004.50 
That left enough time for the House to vote and approve the bill on 
September 23 but not enough time to refer it to the Senate.51 
The timing of the Pledge bill and same-sex marriage bill are cer-
tainly suggestive. More significant, unlike nearly all court-stripping 
proposals, these bills have little to do with federal court decisions up-
setting to lawmakers. True, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
against the Pledge in Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 52 but lawmakers waited 
(more than two years) for the Supreme Court to reverse the Ninth 
Circuit on standing grounds before taking up the bill. 53 More than 
that, when dismissing Newdow, three Justices signaled their support for 
the Pledge and no Justice suggested that the Ninth Circuit decision 
was correct. 54 
The same-sex marriage bill is an even clearer example of Con-
gress tackling an issue for symbolic reasons. No federal court had 
found a constitutional right to same-sex marriage. Indeed, no federal 
court had invalidated the Defense of Marriage Act, 55 legislation that 
44. [2003-2004 Transfer Binder] Cong. Index, supra note 37, at 34,517. 
45. See id. at 20,536 (documenting the legislative history of the Federal Marriage 
Amendment, SJ. Res. 40, 108th Cong. (2004)). 
46. !d. at 34,517. 
47. !d. 
48. H.R. 2028, 108th Cong. (2004) . 
49. [2003-2004 Transfer Binder] Cong. Index, supra note 37, at 34,508. 
50. !d. 
51. !d. 
52. 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 
542 U.S. 1, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004) . 
53. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2312. The Supreme Court issued its Newdow decision on flag 
day, June 14. ld. at 2301. 
54. Chief justice Rehnquist,joined by justices O'Connor and Thomas, argued that the 
Court should have decided the case on its merits and held that the Pledge of Allegiance 
did not violate the Establishment Clause. !d. at 2312. A fourth Justice, Antonin Scalia, 
recused himself from the case because he had given a speech defending the constitutionality 
of the Pledge. /d. at 2301. 
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). 
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would protect state prerogatives over same-sex marriage. And while 
the federal courts might someday extend the Supreme Court's recog-
nition of same-sex sodomy in Lawrence v. Texas, 56 the triggering event 
for this proposal was "the demands of four unelected members of 
[the] Massachusetts State Supreme Court who have overturned the 
laws of the State of Massachusetts and sanctioned same sex mar-
riages. "57 In other words, lawmakers were responding to something 
they had absolutely no authority to police. 
House Republicans were not dissuaded by such legal niceties. 
Their aim was to score points with their base by making judgmental 
statements about the sanctity of heterosexual marriage. After all, the 
November 2004 elections were weeks away and Republican strategists 
had identified same-sex marriage as a linchpin of their efforts to make 
moral values the focus of their campaign to reelect the President and 
strengthen the GOP's hold over Congress.58 
* * * 
That Democrats and Republicans in Congress see the Court as a 
rhetorical whipping boy is hardly surprising. Voters typically see the 
judiciary as a low salience issue. Consequently, increasingly ideologi-
cal lawmakers can play to their increasingly partisan base by condemn-
ing "activist" judges (even state judges!). It simply does not matter 
that lawmakers are not all that upset with the Court. What matters is 
that lawmakers can speak to issues that resonate with their base and, 
in so doing, call attention to differences between the two parties. 
Ironically, lawmakers might pay a price if they were truly upset 
with the Court. Popular support for judicial independence may be 
sufficiently strong that the enactment of court-stripping proposals 
might prompt a political backlash. The true test of this proposition is 
yet to come. As congressional districts become increasingly polarized 
and as presidential races turn more and more on the ability of each 
side to bring out their base, it may be that the conventional wisdom 
about judicial independence will give way to a new era of winner-takes-
all politics. 
56. 539 u.s. 558 (2003). 
57. 150 CoNe. REc. H6609 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) (statement of Rep. Weldon of Flor-
ida). A second trigger was the unilateral (and subsequently rebuffed) efforts of San Fran-
cisco's mayor to recognize same-sex marriage. 150 CoNe. RE.c. at H6583-85 (statement of 
Rep. Chabot). 
58. SeeSarah Baxter, It's Family Values, Stupid, SuNDAY TIMES (U.K.), Nov. 7, 2004, at 15; 
Adam Nagoumey, 'Moral Values' Carried Bush, Rove Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2004, at A20. 
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In the meantime, the Rehnquist Court will fade from view with-
out testing the willingness of Democrats or Republicans to push 
through draconian anti-Court measures. By issuing decisions that 
largely reflect majoritarian norms, the Rehnquist Court did not 
prompt the true ire of either Democrats or Republicans. For that rea-
son, newspapers, voters, and presidential candidates did not pay much 
attention to the Chief Justice's cancer diagnosis and, with it, the 
Court. 
Put another way: In this era of ideological polarization, it is inevi-
table that lawmakers will launch rhetorical attacks against the courts. 
That Court decisions reflected majoritarian norms is simply beside the 
point. But so long as the Court steers a centrist course, ongoing at-
tacks against the judiciary, as the title of this piece suggests, should be 
understood as little more than smoke. For those who fear smoke in-
halation, the current wave of incendiary anti-Court rhetoric is cause 
for concern. Nevertheless, the fires associated with a paradigm shift 
of Court-Congress relations are not yet upon us. 
